The Coasean way to deal with the cooperation failure that is implicit in Pareto inefficiency is to remove or lessen the obstacles to cooperation through the attribution of property rights and the elimination or reduction of transaction costs. The relevance of this approach is however undermined by some intrinsic difficulties to its application in a real world context, such as those arising from the number and indeterminacy of the interested parties, as well as from the free rider problem. A way to extend the Coasean approach taking into account those real life limitations is to consider the local authorities as representatives of the interest of their local constituencies and, through the provision of an adequate institutional framework, to enhance the opportunities for cooperation through voluntary agreements involving private and public parties. Thus the extent of cooperation could be widened, as opposite to traditional remedial actions relying on non-contractual, or direct entrepreneurial action by the state. With the reduction in the appeal of direct and coercive action by the state a number of institutions emphasising the contractual cooperation between public and private parties have effectively grown of importance, as wide apart as the township and village enterprises in China, or the "programmazione negoziata" in Italy. In the final part of the paper the latter experience is briefly reviewed and appraised.
"social sciences progress by means of concepts" (Von Hayek, quoted in Moulin, 1986, p. 6) 1. COORDINATION, COOPERATION, AND THE COASEAN APPROACH TO ECONOMIC POLICY
Coordination and Cooperation
The concept of coordination refers to the carrying out of a set of activities by different individuals so as make them compatible, in order to attain a given social (favourable, at any rate better than without coordination) result. Coordinating decisions, and the resulting activities, is the basic task of an economic system, indeed, of any social system. Coordination can be conscious and aimed for, according to a voluntary agreement, and may then be called cooperation, or can result from separate individual decisions, such as in Nash equilibrium, or in the paradigm of the invisible hand. In the general equilibrium formalization of the latter there is (implicitly at least) bilateral cooperation between buyers and sellers. 1 The overall outcome however involves the attainment of a Pareto efficient state for society as a whole; thus bilateral cooperation results in overall (Pareto) efficient coordination. In the general case of Nash equilibrium (where individuals act independently of explicit agreements) the outcome may turn out to be Pareto inferior to some other state that could be attained through cooperation, leading to 1 Even if markets are described as impersonal and in thick markets, in particular, cooperation may be reduced to the bare element of purchasing and selling a standard commodity at a given market price, transactions in the end take place between individual sellers and individual buyers. In general the market system relies on the fact that satisfactory overall coordination can be achieved through institutions leading to limited cooperation, amounting in most cases to bilateral exchange. On the other hand in the case of the traditional planned socialist economy, coordination is basically achieved through commands, even if there may be substantial elements of cooperation, bilateral or otherwise.
what may be called a cooperation failure. On the other hand, to be stuck in a Nash equilibrium when there is an alternative Pareto superior one is referred to as a coordination failure, as in this case the superior outcome does not necessarily require explicit cooperation: if only the separate self-interested agents were to behave differently (for instance because of different expectations as to the other agents' rational behaviour or on government policy), a better social state could be achieved in an alternative equilibrium situation, even without explicitly striking a deal. For instance, in the macroeconomic theoretical case of multiple equilibria arising from strategic complementarity, 2 the different possible Nash equilibria could depend on different levels of self-fulfilling expectations as to the level of demand.
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In case a Nash equilibrium is Pareto dominated by another state that is not a Nash equilibrium, as in the case of the usual one-shot Prisoner Dilemma, or in the fixed time span Prisoner Dilemma supergame, 4 the Pareto superior state could in principle be achieved through cooperation, if cooperation is possible, which usually means if deals are enforceable. On the other hand it is well known that, in case of an infinitely repeated game, every Pareto efficient outcome dominating a Nash equilibrium can be sustained, even without explicit agreements, if everybody expects Nash reversion 5 as a punishing strategy, provided the discount factors are high enough (intertemporal preferences are not too myopic). If the expected punishing strategy is more severe, the above applies to every outcome that is associated with greater payoffs than those compatible with the maximum punishment the other parties can inflict (this means payoffs that are individually rational). 6 In this we have a kind of implicit cooperation, based upon no explicit agreement, but on the expectation of sanctions by the other players to bring about an expected loss in case of non conforming behaviour.
Pareto Inefficiency as Cooperation Failure
Generally speaking, however, Pareto sub-optimality is tantamount to cooperation failure, as by its very nature a Pareto inferior state could always be improved through cooperation, if cooperation finds no obstacle or constraint. In a nutshell this could be seen as the essence of the so-called Coase theorem. 7 However, for (explicit) cooperation to be possible a set of conditions are required. The first is that the agreements involved in cooperation should be implemented. This is not too complicated when they are struck among a limited number of agents and are enacted simultaneously, such as in barter or spot market exchanges. Even in this basic case however some general requirements concerning law and order must be fulfilled. For instance, the possibility for an agent, instead of entering into a mutually advantageous exchange, to grab somebody else's assets with dexterity or force, and get away with that, or to cheat, misrepresenting the nature of the exchange, should be prevented; in other terms property rights into the possible objects of exchange and rules determining the requirements of proper behaviour should be established, if only, minimally, by the power of custom and social conventions (such as in tribal trades, or trades along the old prehistorical trade 6 This is the content of the famed Folk theorem; see Mas Colell et al., 1995, pp. 418-423. 7 See Coase, 1960 . The nature of the "Coase theorem" has been amply debated in the literature. See for instance Usher (1998) , Dixit and Olson (2000) , where further bibliographical references could be found.
routes that operated in distant past, 8 even without the disciplining power of a state).
But the requirement of implementation becomes more demanding whenever exchanges acquire, as is often the case, an inter-temporal dimension. 10 Indeed, according to Fehr and Gächter (2002) , "cooperation flourishes if altruistic punishment is possible, and breaks down if it is ruled out". This may contribute to explain part of the economic success of Far-eastern societies where "shame" the existence of some specific institutions, such as courts, police, state administration. The way in which these institutions are generated and maintained lies outside the scope of this paper and is the object matter of political theory.
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Whenever lack of ex post enforcement of ex-ante agreements blocks potential efficiency improving transactions, a crucial task of the state is to perform as the enforcer. The importance of the state as the enforcer of contracts is borne out in particular by the recent experience of transition economies. While direct management of the economy by the state has proved relatively wasteful, according to the overall experience of the last century, the experience of transition countries has on the contrary proved how essential the role of the state is as a guarantor of public order and of law enforcement, the enforcement of contracts in particular.
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Even independently of the issue of enforcement there are a number of difficulties in practice that could prevent theoretically possible cooperative deals to be struck:
1. Information. There are two sets of issues: a) Who may benefit from cooperative agreements? How to find them? b) What are the real characteristics of the object of contracting? Through deceit they could be quite different as it appears, whenever, as usually is the case, information is asymmetric, and this possibility allegedly plays a much more important social role than in the West (on this point see Lall, 1998 4. Free riding, whenever the benefits of an agreement could be reaped, because of externalities, by those who choose not to be part to it and to avoid paying the costs that its implementation may require.
The advantage of coordination through thick markets as a way to reach, if not optimal, at least comparatively satisfactory societal outcomes lies in the fact that these are attained by-passing the above difficulties that bedevil cooperation.
The Coasean Approach to Economic Policy
If market failures are tantamount with the fact that potentially mutual beneficial agreements are not struck, it seems somewhat natural that the first task of policy should be to remove, or at least to lessen, the obstacles to Pareto improving voluntary agreements (this could be considered as the classical Coasean approach to economic policy). 5. State intervention should not be such as to make socially improving cooperation more difficult than otherwise could be. This apparently straightforward requirement is not so simple as it appears, however, since not all the possible agreements lead to social improvements, even if the assumed social welfare function has the Paretian property. A basic public task is to impede agreements that are social detracting (whatever the implied social welfare function may be).
This requires distinguishing between social detracting and social improving contracts, and thus to have a set of institutions for controlling agreements, allowing or prohibiting them according to their nature. 16 Let us for instance suppose to have a polluting factory and a great number of residents in the area of pollution. Whether the factory is given or denied the right to pollute it is practically impossible for the residents (all of them) and the factory to strike a deal. A deal could be more easily struck between the factory and the local representative authorities, but this involves issues of a different nature, which are considered in the next section.
17 A straightforward example may be the fixing of minimum wages in a context of monopsonistic power in the labour market.
Social Improving and Social Detracting Transactions
Indeed, a basic difference between economic systems lies in the kinds of transactions that are seen as social detracting, and are therefore forbidden, or as social improving, and are therefore permitted. Under socialism, in its extreme or "classical" Soviet-type form, all kinds of contracts between private individuals leading to the hiring of labour are in principle forbidden. Under "capitalist"
institutions, contracts of this sort are in principle allowed, and even encouraged.
Under most regimes a set of voluntary transactions are considered to be social detracting and therefore forbidden, such as those aiming at carrying out all sort of criminal activities. In market economies some transactions can be forbidden that are specific of these economies, such as falsifying balance sheets, or agreeing about price-setting in a cartel.
The reasons to forbid transactions can be intrinsic (for instance the transaction to sell an organ for transplant in exchange for money or other utilities is seen as unethical and therefore forbidden). But in most cases the basic reason to forbid certain types of transactions lies in the perceived external effects, in the short or in the long run. From a "classical" socialist viewpoint transactions that imply the private hiring of labour are supposed to lead to exploitation and alienation.
Whatever the meanings of these words may be, these are seen as fundamental social evils, and therefore, as a matter of principle, the transactions alleged to bring them about are forbidden. Moreover other externalities of private market behaviour that are supposed to justify its suppression, according to what we may call the extreme socialist viewpoint, are considered to be the propensity to insufficient utilization of productive capacity, and macroeconomic instability generating the business cycle, as well as the tendency to produce excessive economic inequalities. Other less sophisticated views, especially in more backward countries, intrinsically see transactions as a zero sum game: if somebody gains, it means somebody else loses, hence the lack of legitimation of private property rights in the eyes of vast sectors of society. This is even more so, as often may be the case in third world countries, under conditions of widespread violations of law and order leading to private enrichment through socially detracting activities. All this can in turn limit the propensity to risk-taking and entrepreneurship in legitimate social improving activities, and contribute to perpetuate conditions of backwardness.
The Externalities Issue
If we abstract from transactions that are considered intrinsically wrong and are Pareto improvements (somebody loses) are seen as leading to socially preferable outcomes (obviously on the basis of evaluations that respond to criteria different from the Paretian principle).
Hierarchical vs. Voluntary Coordination
In real economies command by some in authority is another method of 
Failures of the Market, Failures of the State, the Nirvana Fallacy, and the

Reverse Nirvana Fallacy.
Building up hierarchies as an alternative to voluntary (contractual) coordination can be justified whenever coordination through hierarchies brings about better overall results. In the Coasean view of the firm, the firm as a (contractually founded) hierarchy is seen as being more efficient than market relations as a tool of 21 The policing and organization of markets require the expenditure of resources that typically is not considered in the basic theoretical framework, but which introduces a type of transaction cost that (together with the other features considered in the text) constitutes an essential departure from it. with remedial actions, out of his superior knowledge and organization, is seen these days as a fallacy, the well known Nirvana fallacy, 24 but was conventional wisdom in a not too distant past, dispelled both by experience and theoretical advances. It is conventional wisdom at present that along with the failures of the market there are the failures of hierarchies, and the failures of the state, and there is no guarantee that 22 For some further perspectives on the nature of the firm a comprehensive but concise summing up is provided by Hart (1989) . 23 Cf. Richardson (1972) . For the nature of collaborative inter-firm relations one may refer in particular to Mariti and Smiley (1983) . For the role of informal networks, sometimes based on ethnic, religious or family ties, see Coleman (1988) , quoted in O' Brien (1999) , where the preconditions to establish these kinds of informal network ties are seen as a component of social capital.
24 Cf. Demsetz, 1969. the latter are any less damaging than the first. 25 On the other hand one should beware of the reverse Nirvana fallacy, rather widespread in some quarters, of assuming that, because the state is imperfect, the market (in the general meaning of voluntary contracts of any sort) must necessarily lead to better results.
2. THE EXTENDED COASEAN APPROACH TO ECONOMIC POLICY
The Extended Coasean Approach and its Limitations
Whenever potential socially improving agreements are frustrated by the obstacles that are resilient to the classical Coasean policy approach, such as those deriving from the indeterminacy of the interested parties, or their great number, leading to excessive transaction costs, or the free rider and social action problem, public bodies, instead of resorting to direct and coercive measures, could become part of 25 As Stiglitz (1994, p. 243) puts it "We live in an imperfect world in which often we face nothing but the choice of the lesser of two evils!" 26 There are some economists of the radical right who purport that because of general considerations (such as the special severity of agency problems in state organization as well as the assumed logic of politicians' and bureaucrats' behaviour) state intervention, if only to furnish pure public goods, must be avoided. But this radical stance is proved to be incoherent by the usually unopposed acceptance of the fact that some basic public goods such as external security and law and order, including the assignment of property rights, must be provided by the state anyway. Thus one does not see why the suitability of publicly furnishing other public goods (instead of leaving the measure of their provision to the market, possibly through the creation of specific and costly barrier to access, with consequent undersupply) should not be considered case by case on its own merits instead of being dismissed by the sleight of a hand. 27 The latter point is an important qualification to the advantages provided 
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On the other hand, if we do not want to be confined to policy measures supposed to lead to effective Pareto improvements only, coercive action is an obvious necessity (in particular in case of measures of a redistributive nature). Moreover, whatever way public bodies intervene, the possibility that their action be captive of private rent-seeking interests must always be taken into account. But this is a general problem of agency: whenever there is a delegation of responsibility there is always the possibility that the agents behave against the interest of the principals and to their own advantage. Outside the area of the state this is obvious in the case of corporations, where officers can act in different well-known ways against the interest of the shareholders. 29 In both cases supervision and control may be necessary. But here again, quis custodiat custodies?, and this applies to both cases.
However there are some well known reasons why the agency problem in case of public bodies may be much more severe. 
The Present Relevance of the Extended Coasean Approach
Coercive and substitute direct types of intervention have lost their appeal, through the collapse of the planned economies, the manifestation of the negative 28 However, some pledges concerning the use of these administrative powers by the public authorities concerned could be part of the deal.
29 Such as through asset stripping or, as has come of prominence in recent times, cashing in stock options after artificially increasing through deceit the value of shares One may recall in this connection Adam Smith's pessimistic appraisal of the agency problem in joint stock companies (cf. Smith, 1976, 740-758) . 30 For instance the usually much greater number of ultimate principals (the voters) increasing the severity of the social action problem, and the fact that the option of "exit" is certainly more practicable for partners or shareholders than for members of political constituencies.
consequences of dirigistic policies all over the world, and the increasing awareness that, if the market fails, so does the state. Thus, the failure of coercive and substitute direct types of intervention enhances the interest for models of policy creating opportunities for the coordination of decisions through mutual agreements by the agents concerned (public or private they be). Different varieties of this kind of approach can be found in successful applications in various institutional and geographical contexts. One may refer to the township and village enterprises in China, based on private-public (or local-state) partnerships, to specific aspects of Japanese and, more in general, far-Eastern industrial policies, 31 implying large scale private-public concerted action, and, turning closer to home, to certain aspects of the functioning of industrial districts or of successful regional economic systems (such as the Baden-Württemberg model) in Europe, making up sorts of "associational economies", as they have been dubbed. 32 Lately the institutions leading to large scale policy interventions based on decentralized compacts between public and private entities have been introduced in Europe, and in Italy, in particular, with the aim to pursue objectives (such as regional development) that previously would have been thought to demand direct intervention from above through planning or direct public economic initiatives. In this framework, as instances of a cooperative, voluntary approach to economic policy, we may refer to the Italian set of institutions that go under the name of "programmazione negoziata"
and the European analogue, the "Employment Territorial Pacts". On the macroeconomic level one may refer to policies based on contractual agreements between the representatives of public and organized interests (income policies). 38 It is not always possible to distinguish neatly the scope of the different institutional forms of the "Programmazione negoziata" (such as "Intese istituzionali di programma", "Accordi di programma quadro", "Patti territoriali", "Contratti di programma", "Contratti d'area"). As we see in a moment a substantial aspect of all them seems to be the basic aim to draw financial resources, and in particular subsidies, for local development. 39 Another, more concrete, hope is apparently to induce the local authorities to organize projects which could draw the support of European Union structural funds.
In this respect at least the programmazione negoziata has been rather successful. One should also consider that the organization and implementation of territorial pacts are not devoid of real costs, administrative and otherwise. The financial resources that are used for the initiatives envisaged in the pacts have an obvious opportunity cost, if only in terms of reduced financing of other alternative initiatives, and there is no prima facie reason why credit at concessionary rates should be included, as is usually the case, not to speak of the huge investment subsidies that have been mentioned above.
On the other hand the subsidies and sundry advantages that are offered may stimulate local initiative and coordination which otherwise would stay latent, and lead to the creation of some social capital through the effort, however artificial, in coordinating decisions. Much depends on the extend of subsidies; some subsidies may be an incentive to local initiative and project-making. Too much may lead to waste of resources and the creation of economic initiatives which may not be self- 42 In reality in the period in which the territorial pacts were introduced a consensus was emerging that the norms that regulate employment contracts in Italy were much too rigid and a cause of unemployment. Pending a wholesale rehauling of Italian labour relations, some weakening of existing rules were introduced in a piecemeal fashion, among others in the design of territorial pacts. there is a strong case for setting up institutions for favouring the voluntary coordination of various private and public decisions. In practice the suitability of these institutions depends on the quality of public intervention and organization that would be brought about by them. The way to favour socially improving coordinating agreements is for the state to introduce into the legal system instruments for their determination, enforcement and validation, and, at the same time, to provide some suitable contribution to the provision of the required 43 This applies in particular to investment subsidies in the South. For an appraisal of some more successful experiences of territorial pacts elsewhere, see Regalia (2002), pp. 7-9. institutional infrastructure. In the practice of European territorial pacts these have been vehicles for the distribution of subsidies. But this is only one possible, and not particular commendable, use of this kind of institution of economic coordination.
